Whether a court may rely on factors apparent in the record to explain a prosecutor's seemingly discriminatory peremptory strike at Batson's first step

QUESTION PRESENTED The Court’s Batson v. Kentucky framework “4s designed to produce actual answers to suspicions and inferences that discrimination may have infected the jury selection process” by motivating a prosecutor’s peremptory strike. Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 172 (2005) (explaining Batson, 476 U.S. 79, 97-98 (1986)). The Batson framework involves three steps: once a criminal defendant “has made out a prima facie case of racial discrimination (step one), the burden of production shifts to the proponent of the strike [7.e. the prosecution] to come forward with a race-neutral explanation (step two).” Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767 (1995) (per curiam). The prosecutor’s explanation can be “4mplausible or fantastic,” or “silly or superstitious,” as long as it is facially race-neutral. Id. at 767-68. “Ifaraceneutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide (step three) whether the [defendant] has proved purposeful racial discrimination.” Jd. at 767. “At that stage, implausible or fantastic justifications may (and probably will) be found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination.” Id. at 768. The question presented is: Whether, at Batson’s first step and in the absence of any explanation from the prosecutor, a court may rely on factors apparent in the record to explain a prosecutor’s seemingly discriminatory peremptory strike.