Whether a federally certificated Pilot demonstrated injury-in-fact

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Pro Se pilot, and aircraft owner, domiciled at a federally-funded airport, was denied standing by both the District Court and Ninth Circuit to challenge government entity actions which both usurped the express intent of Congress and denied pilot his statutory rights, asks the Court to confirm standing and compel review process consistent with NRDC v. FAA, 564 F.3d 549, 555 (2nd Cir. 2009) as Ninth Circuit prematurely denied standing for want of redressable harm under M.S. v. Brown, 902 F.3d 1076, 1083 (9th 2018), and improperly branding pilot a serial litigant; incident thereto, the Court is also asked to review certain due process hurdles Pro Se litigants face. THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED ARE: 1. Whether a federally certificated Pilot, who has a special and substantial interest in a not only a public-use airport but the entire national airspace system, demonstrated injury-in-fact when his interests protected by underlying statutes, were violated by the government respondents, when they entered into a settlement agreement that allowed immediate shortening of the runway, in addition to allowing closure of the airport and did so without seeking statutorily required public input on local, state and federal levels. 2. Whether Congress statutorily imparted standing on entire aviation community (including Pilots), via an express right to use the airspace system and right of consultation on matters pertaining to the airports and the airspace system, under 49 U.S.C. § 40103, Airway and Airport Improvement Act 49 U.S.C. § 47101 et seg. and specifically 49 U.S.C. § 47103(b)(1). ii 3. Whether Petitioner’s separation of powers Claims, which did not require standing (see Leedom) due to the (executive branch) FAA’s separation of powers violation when it usurped the unambiguous statutory intent of Congress in releasing an airport from the obligation to by operated in perpetuity under the 1944 Surplus Property Act (Abolished by the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act (63 Stat. 738), June 30, 1949 and transferred to other agencies). See also 49 U.S.C. § 47151. 4. Whether a Circuit split exists on the issue of the Standing of a between the 2nd and 9th circuits with the 2nd circuit having determined that pilot users of an airport demonstrate the requisite substantial interest to challenge an FAA order (or in the case an action) see NRDC, Inc. v. FAA, 564 F.3d 549, 555 (2nd Cir. 2009). 5. Whether the District Court erred in failing to allow leave to amend to the Pro Se Petitioner, especially upon being the first pleading to be attacked regarding the sufficiency of [the Petitioner’s] allegations. 6. Whether justice requires, a district court should ‘freely give leave’ to amend a complaint pursuant to FRCP 15(a) (see Foman). 7. Whether the District Court erred in dismissing the entire complaint and writ of mandate when the government Defendants’ motions to dismiss never addressed the writ of mandate second claim for relief. 8. Whether Petitioner still had an intact right to amend under FRCP 15(a)(1)(b), after Petitioner had first amended prior to service under FRCP 4 and all subsequent amendment had been done with opposing party’s written consent and the court’s leave. iii 9. Whether a Pro Se complaints and other pleadings should be construed liberally in the interest of justice, in order to afford the benefit of any doubt. 10. Whether before dismissing a pro se complaint the district court must provide the litigant with notice of the deficiencies in his complaint in order to ensure that the litigant uses the opportunity to amend effectively. 11. Whether a Pro Se litigant should be afforded extra opportunity to amend before prior to applying a futility analysis (i.e. could not be saved by any further amendment). 12. Whether notice by a means other than those authorized by Rule 5(b) comport with the constitutional requisite for notice (Ze. service of process) (see Mullane) 13. Whether the overall implementation the CM