Is a detainee's first appearance in court a 'critical stage' of the proceedings?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Over the course of 28 years, Contra Costa County denied counsel to all indigent detainees at their first appearance in court and automatically continued their cases to “counsel and plea” dates that were typically one to two weeks later. During this uncounseled period, detainees were unable to apply for bail, enter a plea, or demand a preliminary hearing within 10 court days as provided by California Penal Code § 859(b). Detainees with retained counsel were able to immediately assert these rights. The Ninth Circuit determined that this practice was constitutionally permissible. The Questions Presented Are: Is a detainee’s first appearance in court a “critical stage” of the proceedings, when bail is set and statutory liberty interests are adjudicated, as the Second and Eighth Circuits and the highest courts of Connecticut, Maryland, New York and Pennsylvania hold, or are the Fifth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits and the Supreme Courts of Alabama, Michigan, Mississippi and Missouri correct in holding that the first court appearance is not a “critical stage,” enabling them to defer appointment of counsel until a “critical stage,” which may occur weeks, months, or more than a year later? Should this Court formulate a standard for determining when counsel must be appointed for indigent detainees under the Sixth Amendment, the Due Process Clause, or Equal Protection Clause given that the federal courts of appeals are irreconcilably divided on: (a) whether the Sixth Amendment permits indefinite denial of counsel u to detainees in the absence of prejudice; (b) whether due process requires a counseled, individualized bail hearing within 48 hours of arrest; and (c) whether delayed representation violates equal protection. Should this Court exercise its supervisory power when: (a) the District Court announced the standards of review after the matter was submitted; (b) the District Court conducted a bench trial by affidavit; (c) the Ninth Circuit failed to conduct de novo review of the constitutional standards promulgated by the magistrate judge answering the question left open by this Court in Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., Tex., 554 U.S. 191 (2008) concerning what standards should apply in determining when delay in appointing counsel is unreasonably long; and (d) the Ninth Circuit avoided ruling on the potentially dispositive issue of whether the Heck preclusion doctrine would bar a civil rights action based upon denial of counsel at the “critical stage” of arraignment by erroneously claiming that the issue was not argued in appellant’s opening brief and was, therefore, waived?