Are prosecuting attorneys entitled to the same good faith exemption from the exclusionary rule as police officers?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Today, prosecuting attorneys all too frequently are part of and lead the investigating team. They are not brought a case investigated and prepared by law enforcement to evaluate for prosecution. In this case, a prosecutor’s ex parte motion resulted in an order leading to electronically tracking Reed historically and in real time, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, for months, using CSLI and GPS.. After Reed’s case was vacated and remanded by this Court because of Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. ___ 16402, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2019), the prosecution raised good faith as a defense to their unconstitutional action. Virginia’s courts treated the prosecution as if dealing with a police officer acting in the moment on the street. I. Are prosecuting attorneys who engage with a court in the course of conducting a criminal investigation, such as obtaining an ex parte order, entitled to the same good faith exemption from the exclusionary rule that this Court allowed for a police officer acting in the moment in I/linois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987), under the same standard and analysis as police, or are lawyers different, requiring a different standard and analysis? I. When a prosecutor who has used an unconstitutional method to obtain evidence in a criminal investigation raises the affirmative defense of good faith, like that raised by the police officer in Illinois v. Krull, supra, to exempt their action from “ie the exclusionary rule, should the court deciding their claim have a factual record about what the prosecution knew or was chargeable with knowing and what they did or did not do for its decision?