Does the Eleventh Circuit's practice of applying published panel orders—issued in the context of an application for leave to file a second or successive § 2255 motion and decided in a truncated time frame without adversarial testing—as binding precedent in all subsequent appellate and collateral proceedings deprive inmates and criminal defendants of their right to due process, fundamental fairness, and meaningful review of the claims presented in their § 2255 motions and direct appeals?

QUESTION PRESENTED In the Eleventh Circuit, law established in a published, three-judge panel order issued pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) in the context of an application for leave to file second or successive § 2255 motion constitutes binding precedent for a// subsequent Eleventh Circuit panels, including those reviewing a direct appeal or initial § 2255 motion. These published panel orders are decided on an emergency 30-day basis, without counseled briefing from either party, and without the opportunity for further review in this Court or the Eleventh Circuit. In Mr. Murray’s case, both the district court and the Eleventh Circuit determined that his initia/ 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion was due to be denied based on the precedent announced in several of these orders. The question presented is: Does the Eleventh Circuit’s practice of applying published panel orders—issued in the context of an application for leave to file a second or successive § 2255 motion and decided in a truncated time frame without adversarial testing—as binding precedent in a// subsequent appellate and collateral proceedings deprive inmates and criminal defendants of their right to due process, fundamental fairness, and meaningful review of the claims presented in their § 2255 motions and direct appeals? ii