Whether Petitioner is entitled to a Writ of Certiorari under the All Writs Act against the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or against the US District Court for the SDNY to order the SDNY to reinstate and adjudicate Petitioner's strict liability patent infringement and nonjoinder amended complaint

QUESTIONS PRESENTED (2) 1. Question #1: In this US patent litigation, whether Petitioner, a Pro Se patentee who is sole named inventor of valuable US ticketing method, apparatus and design patents!, is entitled to a Writ of Certiorari under the All Writs Act, 28 USC §1651(a), against the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or against the US District Court for the SDNY directly to order the SDNY to reinstate and adjudicate Petitioner’s strict liability patent infringement and nonjoinder amended complaint also seeking injunctive relief pursuant to 35 USC §§271, 256, FRCP Rule 15, duly filed, date-stamped and docketed by the SDNY Clerk that was unlawfully deleted ex parte from the district court docket without notice to Plaintiff in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and never thereafter reinstated or adjudicated? Based on Justice William Brennan’s 1988 “ping pong’ decision and order in Christianson 1 Gurvey US Ticketing Patent Nos. 7603321; 6479108 ‘issued on October 13, 2009 and November 1, 2011. 1 uv. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 486 US 800 (1988) (Brennan, J.), the answer to the above question would definitely be “yes” and the Supreme Court must grant the writ to maintain consistency with established patent decisions. The Federal Circuit and the Second Circuit have been shuffling Petitioner’s patent appeal to the 2017 summary judgment orders of the SDNY denying Petitioner’s cross-motion seeking strict liability infringement and nonjoinder patent damages back and forth for three years each claiming the other has jurisdiction. Justice Brennan stated that he has no tolerance for this type of dispute that significantly prejudices the appellant, that the two arguing appellate courts should attempt to resolve the dispute by abiding by the doctrine of law of the case, but that in a patent case, a coordinate appeals court that lacks arising under jurisdiction, cannot as a matter of law, establish law of the case by usurping its jurisdictional power and authority. In this case, two appeals courts have played “ping pong” with Petitioner's appeal. Because a patentee is absolutely entitled to file an amended complaint to recover strict liability infringement damages against the named 2 ® defendants when an anticipated US patent issues during the litigation, and infringement claims are always “arising under” claims, the SDNY blatantly usurped it power by deleting the docketed amended complaint and not granting any amended complaint for service post patent issuance in 2010, 2012 and 2014. Reedy v. Scott, 90 US 352 (1874). In addition, based on the Federal Circuit’s June 23, 2020 order, the Second Circuit’s liberal pleading practices mandated both that the deleted amended complaint be granted for service and that even a further amended complaint could also granted post judgment. Grant Williams v. Citicorp, 659 F. 3d 208 (2d Cir 2011). However, in accordance with Christianson, : supra, in the instant case, it is the Federal Circuit and not the Second Circuit that established “law of the case” by finding on June 23, 2020 that the Second Circuit abused discretion in adjudicating the previous 2017 patent appeal to the summary judgment orders of the SDNY and not transferring that appeal to the Federal Circuit pursuant to 28 — USC §1631 in response to Petitioner’s motion. In essence the Federal Circuit agreed that the Second Circuit had no power to hear the previous arising under appeal. 3 Per Justice Brennan, because law of the case cannot be established by a coordinate appeals court that lacks jurisdiction, only the Federal : Circuit can issue a subsequent writ under the All Writs Act against the same district court in an arising under patent case for the duration of the lawsuit. [28 USC §§1295; 1651(a); In re Princo, 478 F. 3d 1345 (Fed Cir. : 2007)]. 2. Question #2: Whether Petitioner is entitled to a separate writ against the Federal Circuit or against the Second Circuit directly to vacate Second Circui