Is it a question of law for the District Court and/or the Appeals Court judges to unjustly violate a Pro Se litigant's procedural due process or violate a Pro Se litigant's right under the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution to a jury trial, while inappropriately applying the pleading standards established by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, to destroy all economic value of Pro Se litigant's valid intellectual property rights, i.e. patents?

QUESTION PRESENTED At a minimum, I need only show three things in order to have standing to sue: (1) that I have suffered an “injury in fact”; (2) that the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) that it is likely that a favorable decision will fully redress the injury. See, for example, Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S Ct 2130, 2136 (1992). These three requirements are derived from Article III of the Constitution, which limits the judicial power to “Cases” and “Controversies.” US Const, Art I, § 2. They must be shown “at a minimum” ” because prudential requirements of standing might also limit plaintiffs. Patents are only valuable if they can be enforced, so any “unjustified” decisions made on valid patents by the Courts, that make enforcing a patent virtually impossible, more expensive and less certain as to the outcome, harms the patent owner and undermines the ability of the U.S. economy to protect inventors’ rights. The Second Circuit has decided that it is not the district court's task in reviewing a motion to dismiss to decide between two plausible inferences that may be drawn from the factual allegations in the complaint: “A court ruling on such a motion may not properly dismiss a complaint that states a plausible version of the events merely because the court finds a different version more plausible.” Anderson News, L.L.C. v. Am. Media, Inc., 680 F.3d 162, 185 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 846 (2013). Even after Twombly and Iqbal, “in determining whether a complaint states a claim ; that is plausible, the court is required to proceed ‘on the assumption that all the [factual] allegations in the complaint are true’, [e]ven if their truth seems doubtful.” Jd. at 185 (court's emphasis) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). ii , Is it a question of law, for the District Court and/or the Appeals Court judges to unjustly violate a Pro Se litigant’s procedural due process, or violate a Pro Se litigant’s right under the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution to a jury trial, while inappropriately applying the pleading standards established by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), to destroy all economic value of Pro Se litigant’s valid intellectual property rights, i.e. patents?! 1 Is it a question of law (legal), for the District Court and/or the Appeals Court judges (when acting.on defendants’ . behalf by submitting defense motions to dismiss), to unjustly violate a Pro Se litigant’s procedural due process (afforded by the Courts of certain procedures; "due process", before depriving [patent owners] individuals of certain interests—iife, liberty, or [patent] property), or, violate a Pro Se litigant’s right under the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution (guarantees the right to jury trial in certain civil cases and requires civil jury trials in federal courts), while inappropriately applying the pleading standards (courts do not require “heightened fact pleading of specifics”; but only, “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”), established by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)? iv . ;