Whether the 'reasonable likelihood' standard applies to cases where the defendant acted with intent to prevent communications only to state officials

QUESTION PRESENTED The federal witness tampering statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1512, permits conviction of any individual who “prevent[s] the communication by any person to a [Federal] law enforcement officer . . . of information relating to the commission. . . of a Federal offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C). The statute requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with the specific intent to prevent the witness from communicating with federal officials. Id. This Court held in Fowler v. United States, 563 U.S. 668 (2011), that, when the defendant did not have a particular official or group of officials in mind, but acted with an intent to prevent communications to any and all officials — including federal officers — the statute may be satisfied by proof that there was a “reasonable likelihood” that the witness would have spoken to a federal official about the offense. 563 U.S. at 677-78. The question presented is whether, as some circuits (including the court of appeals in this case) have held, that the “reasonable likelihood” standard applies even in cases in which the defendant acted with the intent to prevent communications only to state officials, and that the statute permits conviction in those cases if there was a probability (or even just a possibility) that the defendant would have communicated with a federal officer. (i)