Whether cloaking jurors in anonymity impermissibly impairs the presumption of innocence and the right of the accused to an impartial jury

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW For years now, district courts have ordered that jury members be cloaked in anonymity in some criminal cases. Anonymity means that the members’ names, addresses, and places of employment are kept from the lawyers trying the case. Anonymity takes away the most basic information on which a cause or peremptory challenge might be based and it limits lawyers seeking to obtain additional information relevant to a challenge. The courts of appeals have held anonymity permissible as a procedure, and have routinely affirmed the use of particular anonymous juries. Along with anonymity, the courts of appeals have routinely approved heightened security measures, such as ostentatious separation and guarding of the anonymous jury during trial. Those measures suggest the accused is to be feared and avoided; that is, that he is the type of person who should be jailed. The Court has never passed on the propriety of anonymous juries and their related security protocols. The questions presented are (1) whether cloaking jurors in anonymity impermissibly impairs the presumption of innocence and the right of the accused to an impartial jury and (2) what measures must be taken, if anonymous juries are permitted, to protect the accused’s right to a presumption of innocence and an impartiality of the jury.