Does the Eleventh Circuit's practice of applying published panel orders as binding precedent deprive inmates of due process?

QUESTION PRESENTED L Does the Eleventh Circuit’s practice of applying published panel orders—issued in the context of an application for leave to file a second or successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion and decided in a truncated time frame without adversarial testing—as binding precedent in a// subsequent appellate and collateral proceedings deprive inmates and criminal defendants of their right to due process, fundamental fairness, and meaningful review of the claims presented in their § 2255 motions and direct appeals? I. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a predicate conviction for bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) categorically qualifies as a “crime of violence” for purposes of the elements clause in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A). However, as the history and text of the federal bank robbery statute make clear—and as prosecutions under the statute illustrate—section 2113(a) may be violated: (1) by unintended or otherwise accidental intimidation; or (2) by extortionate threats to economic interests alone. Given these circumstances, can the Eleventh Circuit’s holding be reconciled with this Court’s precedent in Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004), Curtis Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010), and Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016)? ii