1. Circuit courts, including the Ninth Circuit here, are analogizing the element of "intimidation" in 18 U.S.C. § 2113 with the element of "fear of injury" in the definition of robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 1951, and holding that because federal bank robbery qualifies as a crime of violence on the basis of the "intimidation" element, so must Hobbs Act robbery on the basis of the "fear of injury" element. Hobbs Act robbery, like the federal bank robbery statute, does not require proof that when the defendant acted he was aware that his conduct would be perceived as intimidating by anyone. The question presented is whether reasonable jurists can debate whether a conviction must necessarily establish that a defendant was more than negligent as to whether his intentional conduct could harm another before said conviction can serve as a predicate under § 924(c)(1) or whether, as the Ninth Circuit's analysis assumes, the limiting language "against the person of another" in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A) is mere surplusage?

2. Where the plain language of § 1951 extends Hobbs Act robbery to include injury to property without limitation, and a Hobbs Act robbery effected by placing someone in fear of a future injury to intangible property clearly does not require the use, threatened use or attempted use of physical force, does the "realistic probability" limitation this Court identified in Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (2007) apply such that the burden is on the defendant to provide examples of the government applying the broad language of the statute in a particular case, or does the plain language of the statute control?

3. Whether a conviction for attempted Hobbs Act robbery necessarily establishes that a defendant used, attempted to use or threatened to use physical force against the person or property of another as required under § 924(c)(3)(A). [Harris only].

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