Whether a burglary statute that omits the element of specific intent qualifies as generic 'burglary' for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act

QUESTION PRESENTED An essential element of generic “burglary” is that the person formed the specific intent to commit a crime at some point during the commission of the offense. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990); Quarles v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1872, 1879 (2019). Tennessee, like a small handful of other states, has expanded its definition of burglary to omit the element of specific intent. Under this expanded definition, a person may be convicted of burglary when he or she trespasses in a building with no intent to commit a crime and, while there, commits a reckless or negligent crime, never having formed the specific intent to commit a crime at any time. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-402(a)(8). Is a burglary statute that omits the element of specific intent a generic “burglary” for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)? ii