Did the court of appeals err in requiring Petitioner Vaun Monroe to show, on a motion to dismiss, that equitable-estoppel can only arise when a defendant is shown to have engaged in a 'deliberate-design' to mislead him

QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Did the court of appeals err in requiring Petitioner Vaun Monroe (“Monroe”) to show, on a motion to dismiss, that equitable estoppel can only arise when a defendant is shown to have engaged in a “deliberate design” to mislead him, which ruling is in tension with the standard for equitable estoppel employed in the majority of the other Circuit Courts of appeals as well as the Circuit Courts inter se? 2. Did the court of appeals err in giving no deference or weight to the EEOC’s assumption of jurisdiction on Monroe’s charge filing, and subsequent investigation of the charge for three years resulting in the issuance of a “right to sue” letter, as reflecting a timely assertion of his claims with that agency? The questions presented arise in the following context: Monroe is an award-winning director and film maker, who teaches directing, screenwriting and film studies. He was the first and only Black male hired as a tenure-track professor in the Film and Video Department of Columbia College Chicago. (“Columbia”). He was denied tenure by the Columbia in 2013. Pursuant to Columbia’s “up or out” tenure system, if tenure is denied, the faculty member is afforded a final or “terminal” year of employment before the employment relationship ends. While employed in his “terminal year”, Monroe filed a complaint of discrimination with the City of Chicago Commission on Human Relations, alleging racial ii discrimination and workplace retaliation. While in his “terminal year,” he subsequently filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC in February 2014, which charge was accepted and investigated for three years, resulting in a “right to sue” letter issued in May 2017. Monroe timely filed suit thereafter. His discrimination suit for violation of Title VII and 43 U.S.C. §1981 was dismissed by the trial court on the basis that the tenure recommendation of Columbia’s provost was the last adverse employment action (March 18, 2013), rather than the later decision of Columbia’s president denying tenure (August 12, 2013). Since the provost’s decision was 326 days prior to Monroe’s filing with the EEOC, the trial court dismissed with prejudice the Title VII (and §1981) claims of the amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). The Court rejected Monroe’s reliance on equitable estoppel based on (1) Columbia’s president earlier informing Monroe that the president makes final employment decisions, and (2) Columbia’s affirmative statement to the EEOC that the president’s decision was the operative date for the denial of tenure. Some two years after dismissing Monroe’s Title VII and §1981, the trial court entered summary judgment on Monroe’s Title VI claim on the same late-filing basis, even though Columbia belatedly raised that issue on summary judgment without having asserted an affirmative defense regarding late filing either in answer to the complaint or amended complaint, in violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c), bullet 17. Columbia iii also did not include the late filing defense to the Title VI claim in its earlier motion to dismiss. The merits of Monroe’s discrimination claims were never reached. Most unusually, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals divided the appeal into two rulings: it issued a precedential opinion only on the statute of limitations for Title VI claims (announcing for the first time at the Circuit level that a two-year statue applies). At the same time, it issued a separate nonprecedential, unsigned Order that affirmed the dismissal of Monroe’s Title VII and §1981 claims (and state claims) on all grounds asserted. No reason was given for this splitting of its rulings in this manner. The effect of that splitting is to both shroud for review the Seventh Circuit’s ruling on the issue of equitable estoppel, which was a primary issue on appeal, and to obscure the significant Circuit Court conflicts that exist on this issue. By this Petition, Monroe seeks relief with regard to the dismissal of his Title VII and §1981 cla