Whether Spending Clause statutes give rise to privately enforceable rights under § 1983

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Four days ago, this Court prudently granted certiorari to “reexamine its holding that Spending Clause legislation gives rise to privately enforceable rights under Section 1983.” Health and Hospital Corp. of Marion County v. Talevski, No. 21-806 (certiorari granted May 2, 2022). As the decision below highlights, the Court’s “caselaw on implied private rights of action remains plagued by confusion and uncertainty.” App.28a (Richardson, J., concurring). And “clarity” is badly needed. Ibid. Granting the instant petition would ensure the Court provides such clarity next Term. First, this petition challenges a final judgment order that was affirmed on appeal (unlike Talevski). Second, this petition gives the Court an opportunity to resolve an “important and recurring” question at the heart of a deep circuit split: whether individual Medicaid recipients have a privately enforceable right to demand a provider of their choice. Gee v. Planned Parenthood of Gulf Coast, Inc, 139 S. Ct. 408, 409 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). The questions presented are: 1. Whether Spending Clause statutes ever give rise to privately enforceable rights under § 1983, and if so, what is the proper framework for deciding when they do? 2. Whether, assuming Spending Clause statutes ever give rise to privately enforceable rights under § 1983, the Medicaid Act’s provision creates a privately enforceable right to challenge a state’s determination that a provider is not qualified to provide certain medical services.