When the unconstitutionality of an officer's conduct is obvious, must the court, in addressing the 'clearly established law' prong of a qualified immunity defense under the Fourth Amendment, analyze whether there are reasons, separate and apart from factually analogous precedent, why a reasonable officer could still have 'fair notice' that his actions are unconstitutional, taking into account the 'totality of the circumstances' confronted by the officer?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Context: This case involves an innocent homeowner who was shot and killed by a sheriff’s deputy after he and other deputies went to the wrong residence (the Powells’ house) because of an imprecise dispatcher’s direction given by the 911 operator. The officers in dark uniforms arrived on the scene in stealth mode in the middle of the night with only minimal lighting from their flashlights. Awakened by their dogs barking and seeing lights outside, Mr. Powell with his wife walking beside him exited the house believing that a prowler was outside. Mr. Powell, a veteran, had a pistol in his right hand. As they slowly exited the house from the garage and onto the driveway, over seventeen seconds passed during which time Mr. Powell’s pistol was pointed down at the ground and no aggressive threats or movements were made by Mr. Powell. Yet, no officers identified themselves, gave any commands, or said anything as the Powells exited the house. Unaware of the officers’ presence, as Mr. Powell stopped in the driveway, he began to raise his right arm when he was shot and killed by Officer Snook. The three questions presented are: 1. When the unconstitutionality of an officer’s conduct is obvious, must the court, in addressing the “clearly established law” prong of a qualified immunity defense under the Fourth Amendment, analyze whether there are reasons, separate and apart from factually analogous precedent, why a reasonable officer could still have “fair notice” u that his actions are unconstitutional, taking into account the “totality of the circumstances” confronted by the officer? 2. Inaddressing the touchstone question of whether prior precedent can give “fair notice” to an officer that his conduct is unconstitutional, is it proper for the court to limit its inquiry to the moment deadly force was used without considering whether a prior warning was “feasible” during a time when the suspect did not pose an immediate threat of harm to the officer or others? While Petitioners’ counsel believe question number 3 below is subsumed within the first two questions presented, nevertheless, out of an abundance of caution, it is presented as a separate question. 3 Ina case involving the use of deadly force against an armed suspect, does the Eleventh Circuit’s holding that—in order to reach the level of “fair notice” required to defeat an officer’s qualified immunity—prior precedent must clearly establish that a warning must be given “at the earliest possible time” conflict with this Court’s precedent in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) that a warning is required where it was feasible to do so?