Whether the Fourth Circuit erred in concluding that a conviction for South Carolina carjacking is categorically a crime of violence under the Armed Career Criminal Act

QUESTION PRESENTED 1. Whether the Fourth Circuit erred in concluding that a conviction for South Carolina carjacking, S.C. Code § 16-3-1075, is categorically a crime of violence under the force clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)G), where the state carjacking statute, on its face, criminalizes taking a vehicle by “by force and violence or by intimidation.” 2. Whether the Fourth Circuit, departing from this Court’s instructions that the categorical approach focuses on the usual and customary meaning of a statute’s plain text, erred in placing improper weight on Petitioner’s failure to identify “actual cases” demonstrating nonviolent applications of South Carolina’s carjacking statute—even though the South Carolina statute, on its face, criminalizes acts of “intimidation” that are not necessarily violent.