Whether a traffic stop that is otherwise lawful fails the duration test of Rodriguez v. United States and is unconstitutionally prolonged, even if the prolongation is of short duration, when the police promptly summoned a drug dog without reasonable suspicion, failed to exercise diligence, and diverted from the stop's stated mission

QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. For an otherwise lawful traffic stop for a routine traffic violation, does the stop fail the duration test of Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015), and is it unconstitutionally prolonged in violation of the Fourth Amendment, even if that prolongation is of short duration, when the local police promptly summoned a drug dog to the scene without reasonable suspicion of a drug crime, failed to exercise diligence in performing mission tasks and slow-walked their completion, and, while waiting for the dog, diverted from the stop’s stated traffic mission in multiple and time-consuming ways including by ordering the passenger out of the car, patting her down, and questioning her for identification information and whether she has outstanding warrants or court cases? 2. The Court in Terry v. Ohio held that the degree of intrusion of a search or seizure must be “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place.” 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968). The Court has recognized that the “scope” principles from Terry also apply to traffic stops, Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354, and the scope inquiry is not only confined to duration but also includes the manner and means by which the stop is conducted. Even aside from the duration of a routine traffic stop, does the scope of a stop exceed that which is permissible under the Fourth Amendment when the manner and means used by local police in conducting that routine traffic stop—in this case, for example, by amassing eleven armed white officers and a drug dog, forcing the two Black occupants out of the vehicle, and subjecting them to pat downs and their vehicle to a drug-dog-sniff, with no reasonable suspicion for doing so—are unreasonably intrusive for purposes of the stop’s stated traffic mission, here, too much window tint? 3. The Fourth Amendment and this Court’s case law require that police must have “reasonable suspicion” to extend a traffic stop to conduct a drug-dog sniff for possible drug crimes. In circumstances such as Petitioner’s November 11 stop, where the subject roadside encounter was i between, on the one hand, eleven armed white police officers and a drug dog, and, on the other, a stopped driver and his sole passenger who were both Black, is it clearly erroneous and contrary to law for such “reasonable suspicion” to be satisfied, in whole or in part, by alleged police-declared “nervousness” of the stopped vehicle’s driver and/or passenger, and when the police body-cam videos of the encounter contradict such alleged “nervousness”? ii