Whether the Circuits have interpreted the actus reus of federal carjacking too narrowly by requiring the threat of violent physical force as an element of the offense

Question Presented for Review By its plain language, federal carjacking can be committed by “intimidation.” 18 U.S.C. § 2119. This Court recognizes carjacking by intimidation is satisfied by “an empty threat, or intimidating bluff.” Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 11 (1999). Thus, a defendant could be found guilty of carjacking by intimidation in a “case in which the driver surrendered or otherwise lost control over his car” without the defendant ever using, attempting to use, or threatening to use physical force. Id. While the government must prove the defendant “would have at least attempted to seriously harm or kill the driver if that action had been necessary to complete the taking of the car,” the statute does not require the outward threat of such harm to obtain a carjacking conviction. Id. In the crime of violence context, have the Circuits interpreted the actus reus of federal carjacking too narrowly by providing the threat of violent physical force constitutes an element of the offense? 1