Did the Seventh Circuit misapply 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in holding that the failure to apply Cronic violated 'clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States'?

QUESTION PRESENTED While Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), requires an claimant to prove both deficient performance and prejudice, in United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984), the Court suggested that some “circumstances. . . are so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified.” The Court has applied Cronic to presume prejudice only once—where counsel’s withdrawal left the defendant “entirely without the assistance of counsel on appeal.” Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 88 (1988). Here, Roderick Lewis brought an claim directed at his counsel’s failure at sentencing to say anything more than that Lewis would speak on his own behalf. An Indiana court rejected this claim, finding no prejudice and presuming none under Cronic. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the state court’s no-prejudice determination was reasonable, but nevertheless concluded that the state court should have applied Cronic and granted habeas relief. The question presented is: Did the Seventh Circuit misapply 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in holding that the failure to apply Cronic violated “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States”?