Whether Count 3 conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924 is valid given the unconstitutionality of the predicate crime of violence in Count 2

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW Question I. If Count 3 charging a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924 is without legal, constitutional foundation as it alleges a crime of violence in Count 2, interstate domestic violence in relation to Count 1, kidnapping, which was not a crime of violence pursuant to United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. (2019), how can that be a proper relational predicate “crime of violence” as to sustain a conviction for Count 3? And Count 2 references the “crime of violence” as defined by 18 USC 16, whose residual clause was found unconstitutionally vague in Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U.S.___ (2018). Shouldn’t Kerns’ conviction for Count 3 be reversed, vacated and dismissed with prejudice? Question II — Was the plea taken erroneously and Kerns’ sentence flawed where the elements of the offense of kidnapping were not established therein or there was confusion as to those elements, especially given the ill-defined “otherwise” residual provision of the kidnapping statute. Is that plea constitutionally infirm as the residual “otherwise” clause is unconstitutionally vague and a conviction under it error? Shouldn’t Kerns judgment based on this infirm plea to an unconstitutionally vague element be reversed and vacated? 2 LIST OF ALL