Under Waddington v. Sarausad, does a general jury instruction on accomplice liability relieve the State of its burden to prove specific intent beyond a reasonable doubt

QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Under Waddington v. Sarausad, 555 U.S. 179 (2009), when a conviction requires that the State prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had a specific intent to commit a crime does a general jury instruction on accomplice liability relieve the State of that burden in violation of the defendant’s due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment? 2. Does a death sentence violate the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments when the trial judge overrides the jury’s general sentencing verdict for life imprisonment without the possibility of parole that does not specify whether the jury found at least one aggravating circumstance? 3. Does a death sentence violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment right to an individualized sentencing determination when the trial judge overrides a jury’s sentencing verdict for life imprisonment without the possibility of parole based on the same rationale the trial judge later offers to justify overriding the jury’s sentencing verdict in a different case involving a different defendant and different facts? 4. Did the Court of Appeals err in denying Petitioner a certificate of appealability on these issues?