Jerome Curtis Stancil v. United States
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Whether socially sharing drugs with a friend qualifies as 'distribution' under the ACCA's 'serious-drug-offense' definition
QUESTIONS PRESENTED The Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), (ACCA) mandates a 15year mandatory-minimum term of imprisonment for individuals convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) if they have at least three prior convictions for a “violent felony” or “serious drug offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). A “serious drug offense,” in turn, includes “an offense under State law, involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute a controlled substance.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)Gi) (emphasis added). Here, the Eleventh Circuit held that Mr. Stancil’s prior Virginia conviction for possessing a controlled substance with intent to give it to another individual as an accommodation under Virginia Code § 18.2-248(D)—an offense that required no more than socially sharing drugs with a friend—required “distribution” of a controlled substance and was thus a “serious drug offense.” But at least three other circuits have held that similar conduct is not “distributing” under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). See United States v. Semler, 858 F. App’x 538, 534 (8rd Cir. 2021); Weldon v. United States, 840 F.3d 865 (7th Cir. 2016); United States v. Swiderski, 548 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1977). The ACCA must be understood and read in conjunction with the CSA—indeed, both “serious drug offense” definitions expressly reference the CSA. There is therefore tension in the circuits on whether socially sharing drugs with another qualifies as “distribution.” The questions presented are: 1. Whether socially sharing drugs with a friend qualifies as “distribution” under the ACCA’s “serious drug offense” definition. i 2. Whether the ACCA’s requirement that prior offenses be “committed on occasions different from one another,” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), is unconstitutional. 3. Whether Congress may criminalize intrastate possession of a firearm and ammunition on the sole basis that the firearm and ammunition once moved, before the defendant’s possession, through foreign or interstate commerce. ii