Whether the trial court's requirement that Charles Gregory Clark be visibly restrained during his entire capital murder trial without a hearing and necessary findings violated his constitutional rights

QUESTIONS PRESENTED The trial court required Charles Gregory Clark to be visibly restrained during his entire capital murder trial, without a hearing and making no requisite findings regarding their necessity. At trial, the only issue in dispute was whether Mr. Clark had the specific intent to kill required to make the murder capital. The defense psychologist testified that he did not intend to kill. The prosecution psychologist testified that it was “equally possible, or perhaps more so,” that Mr. Clark did not intend to kill. Postconviction counsel failed to interview jurors and abandoned a claim before the postconviction evidentiary hearing. Federal habeas counsel obtained affidavits from two jurors that they had seen the restraints and affidavits from three other jurors who did not believe Mr. Clark had the specific intent to kill. The district court found the shackling claim “substantial” under Martinez v. Ryan, but erroneously concluded that failing to appeal following abandonment of the claim placed it outside Martinez. Without mentioning the weakness of the specific intent evidence, the Eleventh Circuit found the overwhelming evidence that Mr. Clark killed Mr. Ewing made it impossible to establish prejudice for his capital murder conviction, and thus, declared the claim not “substantial” under Martinez. The questions presented are: I. Under Strickland v. Washington, may a circuit court sustain denial of relief by determining a claim is not substantial, where, to do so, it ignores evidence regarding the central issue, thus ignoring the totality of the circumstances as to prejudice? II. Should this Court grant certiorari to resolve the circuit split created when the Eleventh Circuit adopted a stringent “cause” requirement irreconcilable with Martinez’s holding that, whether a claim is substantial is governed by the Miller-El v. Cockrell standard? II. Given this Court’s holdings in Holbrook v. Flynn and Illinois v. Allen, may a circuit court, ignoring the central evidence undergirding the claim, hold an ineffective assistance of counsel shackling claim not substantial when the district court, having addressed thoroughly the underlying strength of the claim, found it substantial and granted a certificate of appealability? 1