Whether magistrate judges exceed their statutory authority by issuing orders with the practical effect of granting or refusing injunctive relief

QUESTIONS PRESENTED The jurisdiction and duties of federal magistrate judges are outlined principally in § 636 of | Title 28 of the United States Code. See Thomas v. Whitworth, 136 F.3d 756, 758 (11th Cir. 1998). The statute, among other things, grants district judges the authority to assign certain pre-trial matters to magistrate judges. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). However, according to the plain language of § 636(b)(1)(A), magistrate judges are expressly prohibited from granting or refusing motions for injunctive relief. Furthermore, in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962), this Court endorsed the exercise of appellate jurisdiction to consider fundamental judicial administration without regard to whether an alleged defect was raised at the earliest practicable opportunity. Jd. at 536. : Notwithstanding, in holding that it “lack[s] jurisdiction over this appeal,” the panel placed undue | emphasis upon the fact that “Appellant did not first appeal the magistrate judge’s decision to the district court.” See Exhibit G at 2-3. Towards that end, the panel relied upon Donovan v. Sarasota Concrete Co., 693 F.2d 1061, 1066-67 (11th Cir. 1982) to suggest that “the order is neither final nor immediately appealable because the district court has not entered an order rendering the magistrate judge’s decision final,” as well as United States v. Schultz, 565 F.3d 1353, 1356 (11th Cir. 2009) to support the notion that “it is well settled that [appellate courts] cannot hear appeals directly from federal magistrates.” Jd. at 3 (internal quotation marks omitted). This Petition presents the following issues: 1. Whether magistrate judges exceed the scope of their statutory authority by issuing orders which have the practical effect of granting or refusing injunctive relief. . 2. Whether the panel’s decision to dismiss Zinman’s appeal, sua sponte, for lack of jurisdiction conflicts with this Court’s binding precedent set forth in Glidden Co. v. | Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962), as well as several decisions which are also binding upon the Eleventh Circuit, including United States v. Schultz, 565 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. i | 2009), U.S. v. Desir, 257 F. 3d 1233 (11th Cir. 2001), U.S. v. Maragh, 189 F.3d 1315 (1th Cir. 1999), and Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (Sth Cir. Unit B 1982). 3. Whether the panel’s determination that it lacks jurisdiction to review the July 14" order conflicts with the binding precedent set forth by this Court in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). 4. Whether the panel’s determination that it lacks jurisdiction to review the July 14% order conflicts with the binding precedent set forth by this Court in Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 84 (1981) and Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 181 (1955). 5. Whether and to what extent litigants must be guaranteed access to courts, especially those challenging mask mandates upon religious grounds, during the so-called “COVID-19 pandemic.” : 6. Whether and to what extent litigants are entitled to the discovery of admissible | evidence. fi |! |