No. 21-642

Jehu Hand v. United States

Lower Court: First Circuit
Docketed: 2021-11-02
Status: Denied
Type: Paid
Response Waived
Tags: criminal-liability disclosure-requirements hype regulatory-interpretation resale-of-shares rule-10b-5 securities-exchange-act securities-law stock-fraud stock-price-crash total-mix-of-information
Key Terms:
AdministrativeLaw Environmental Securities JusticiabilityDoctri
Latest Conference: 2021-12-03
Question Presented (AI Summary)

Can criminal liability under Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5 lie when the 'total mix' of information includes a warning that the public disclosure is 'hype' and that investors can only profit if they resell their shares before the stock price crashes

Question Presented (from Petition)

QUESTIONS PRESENTED A. Can criminal liability under Securities Exchange Act . Rule 10b-5 lie when the “total mix” of information includes a warning that the public disclosure is “hype” and that investors can only profit if they resell their shares before the stock price crashes.* B. Does the rule of lenity preclude criminal liability under Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5 for an attorney’s legal opinion that a company is not a “shell company” when the Securities and Exchange Commission intentionally made the “shell company” definition ambiguous.* C. Is Securities Act Rule 405, which defines “control” for purposes of determining whether a person is an “affiliate” under Rule 144, as “the possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct or cause the direction of the management . and policies of a person, whether through the ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise,” invalid as it is counter to the legislative history of the Securities Act, which indicates that the lodestar defining “control” is simply whether the named person has the power to cause the issuer to file a registration statement covering those securities, and should in fact should Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 843-844 (1984) be overturned. D. Is a district court’s failure to consider a defendant’s inability to pay a fine, and the sanctioning of that failure by the Court of Appeals, procedurally unreasonable, requiring resentencing.* E. Does 18 U.S.C. §3624(e)’s requirement that a criminal fine be paid within two years of release from prison, except in special circumstances, and United States Sentencing Guidelines, §5E1.2(), which mandates that the : i | | | fine, if not immediately payable on sentencing, must be — paid within the maximum term of supervised release . authorized for the offense, indicate that Congress, in providing for the imposition of a fine pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §3571 and §3572, intends that the fine be such amount as can reasonably be expected to be paid within such period of time after release from prison.* F. Is a district court’ failure to adopt or reject disputed . items on the Presentence Report as required by Fed. R. Cr. P. 32(i)(3) procedurally unreasonable, requiring resentencing.* ; * These issues were raised by Petitioner on appeal. | ii | .

Docket Entries

2021-12-06
Petition DENIED.
2021-11-16
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 12/3/2021.
2021-11-08
Waiver of right of respondent United States to respond filed.
2021-10-26
Petition for a writ of certiorari filed. (Response due December 2, 2021)

Attorneys

Jehu Hand
Jehu Hand — Petitioner
Jehu Hand — Petitioner
United States
Elizabeth B. PrelogarSolicitor General, Respondent
Elizabeth B. PrelogarSolicitor General, Respondent