Does the clear and present danger standard apply in contempt proceedings brought to sanction a litigant's extrajudicial criticism of an elected judge after the conclusion of the case?

QUESTION PRESENTED Petitioner Derrick Tyrone Jenkins sent a profane letter to an elected judge who dismissed his civil case with prejudice. Though the time for rehearing had expired, the court initiated indirect criminal contempt proceedings that resulted in jail time for Mr. Jenkins and a probation order that prohibited him from undertaking any “communication . . . intended to lessen the authority and dignity” of any judge or court in the judicial circuit. The only case cited was O’Brien v. State, 248 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971), a decision that affirmed a contempt conviction for out-of-court speech that “tended to degrade the court or the judge as a judicial officer”—a lesser standard than the clear and present danger test. O’Brien also held that this Court’s First Amendment cases had “no application whatsoever to [this] type of communication.” On appeal, Petitioner argued O’Brien conflicted with this Court’s First Amendment decisions. He observed that his political speech could not satisfy the clear and present danger test because the time for rehearing had expired when he sent the letter. He also noted that a federal court on habeas review found the standard used O’Brien unconstitutional. The Fourth District Court of Appeal, over a dissent, affirmed his conviction, again citing only O’Brien. Question Presented: Does the clear and present danger standard apply in_ contempt ii proceedings brought to sanction a_ litigant’s extrajudicial criticism of an elected judge after the conclusion of the case?