Whether the standing analysis for Privacy Act improper disclosure claims requires determining if the plaintiff sufficiently alleged an 'adverse effect' to satisfy traceability, as recognized by previous decisions of this Court, as opposed to requiring allegations of a 'command' or 'compulsion'

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW The Privacy Act prohibits unlawful disclosures by government officials to those with no need to know. Petitioner Khalid Turaani brings this action in response to statements by federal officers to third parties that he is the subject ofa federal investigation and that “we don’t like the company he keeps.” These disclosures have a coercive chilling effect on Mr. Turaani’s right to make lawful constitutional purchases, including exercising his Second Amendment rights, and also damage his reputation in the community. Mr. Turaani brought suit in 2017 for infringement on his Second Amendment rights. Dismissing his Second Amendment claims, the district court noted then that “Turaani is correct that the FBI agent violated 28 C.F.R. § 25.8(g)(2) [the Privacy Act] by disclosing that Turaani was the target of an FBI investigation.” Mr. Turaani next brought suit under the Privacy Act in 2019 after more disclosures. The district court dismissed his Privacy Act claims, applying the same analysis the prior court had for his Second Amendment claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The question presented is: Whether the standing analysis for Privacy Act improper disclosure claims requires determining if the plaintiff sufficiently alleged an “adverse effect” to satisfy traceability, as recognized by previous decisions of this Court, as opposed to requiring allegations of a “command” or “compulsion.” If so, does a plaintiff demonstrate that adverse effect by alleging that the government’s improper disclosures produced a determinative or coercive effect on a third party who refuses to do business with the plaintiff?