Whether a pre-Miller guilty plea bars a post-Miller sentencing challenge under the Eighth Amendment

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW Robert Christopher Jones, a minor, faced a mandatory life without parole sentence for killing two people in 1999. In 2000, Robert, still a minor, avoided the mandatory life sentence by agreeing to plead guilty to one count of murder and other offenses as well, and to receive concurrent sentences, the longest of which was 50 years’ imprisonment. Illinois law requires him to serve every day of that sentence. Robert later brought a collateral challenge to his sentence after this Court invalidated life without parole sentences for minors convicted of homicide in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), and the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, held that a sentence longer than 40 years is a de facto life sentence that may only be imposed on a minor if the judge first considers his youth and the socalled Miller factors. Both the Illinois Appellate Court and the Illinois Supreme Court held that Robert’s pre-Miller guilty plea precluded his post-Miller challenge to his sentence. The Supreme Court went on to rule that, aside from Robert’s plea, he suffered no Eighth Amendment violation because the plea judge exercised discretion in accepting the plea and imposing the de facto life sentence. The presented for review are: (1) Whether a pre-Miller guilty plea bars a post-Miller sentencing challenge under the Eighth Amendment. (2) Whether the sentencing process mandated by Miller and Jones is satisfied where the judge accepts a negotiated plea agreement but fails to consider the attendant circumstances of youth. i