Whether the state court unreasonably applied Faretta v. California by reading a timeliness requirement into the right to self-representation

QUESTIONS PRESENTED In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), this Court held that a criminal defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to represent himself at trial. In McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 §.Ct. 1500 (2018), this Court confirmed that a criminal defendant has a right of autonomy under the Sixth Amendment to insist that defense counsel present a defense of complete innocence. Jd. at 1507-1509. It is undisputed that, in this murder case, defense counsel knew throughout the representation of petitioner’s insistence on a defense of complete innocence and his refusal of a defense based on mental state. 1. Did the state court unreasonably apply Faretta by reading a timeliness requirement into it when it is clear that the references to timing in Faretita bear solely on the knowing and voluntary nature of the request for 2. Assuming a timing component to Faretta, is a Faretta request timely when it is made in good faith at the first court hearing after defense counsel confirms that he intends to betray his commitment that the client’s defense would be limited to innocence? Is a state court’s determination to the contrary on such a record unreasonable? i 3. The trial court refused to appoint new counsel for sentencing after defense counsel vowed to the court that he would not act as petitioner’s advocate on discretionary sentencing decisions but would simply “be the body” and submit the matter. Did the state court unreasonably conclude that petitioner was not denied counsel at sentencing, a critical stage of the proceeding? ii