No. 21-986

Donald A. Vanderveer v. Zoning Board of Appeals, Town of East Hampton, et al.

Lower Court: Second Circuit
Docketed: 2022-01-13
Status: Denied
Type: Paid
Tags: administrative-hearing administrative-law cross-examination due-process land-use liberty-interest property-rights zoning-board
Key Terms:
SocialSecurity DueProcess FirstAmendment Takings JusticiabilityDoctri
Latest Conference: 2022-03-18
Question Presented (AI Summary)

Whether the Second Circuit's Summary Order directly conflicts with Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)

Question Presented (from Petition)

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Since 1947, Petitioner Vanderveer’s Family has owned 3+ acres of land (with a small barn) in the Town of East Hampton, New York. Petitioner asserts he has a “grandfathered” commercial use for “storage, warehouse and distribution facilities” as it’s shown on the real property tax bills for decades, and that is how they used the land. In 2015, the Town placed the land on a list of properties for potential acquisition and appraisals, and it also began to criminally prosecute Petitioner for its use for a commercial storage location. Following his convictions on 7 charges (all later reversed in April 2021), Petitioner sought to have the Town Zoning Board of Appeals issue a written certification for the land’s use for indoor and outdoor storage under the Town’s Code applicable to legally pre-existing non-conforming uses (i.e., uses before 1957, when the area was first zoned as residential). Petitioner was unsuccessful in preventing the extinguishment of his vested right to use the land commercially because of the Town’s land-use boards’ policy of denying all hearing participants, including an “applicant-party” like Vanderveer, any opportunity to exercise his Right to CrossExamine adverse witnesses who speak at board hearings and/or submit letters to the boards. 1. Whether the Second Circuit’s Summary Order directly conflicts with Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), which has interpreted the Due Process Clause as requiring that crossexamination of adverse witnesses be afforded to a party where any property or liberty interest is il being subjected to the risk of deprivation or extinguishment by the government through the mechanism of board hearings, where New York State’s substantive and procedural law routinely deprives a landowner applicant-party of the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses in later state court judicial proceedings whenever the local land-use board previously failed to permit the applicant-party landowner to cross-examine witnesses? 2. Whether the District Court’s decision, and its affirmance, transgressed Petitioner’s First Amendment Right to Cross-Examine adverse witnesses at a local zoning board hearing by imposing unjustified restrictions on speech at a land-use board hearing where the board’s rules lacked a plainly legitimate sweep and evinced an unconstitutional Prior Restraint of Speech of a “party”-applicant with a direct interest in the outcome? 3. In light of Article I, § 8’s protection of the right to engage in commerce, whether an “unconstitutional appropriations” type of “physical taking” identified in Horne v Department of Agriculture, 59 U.S. 513 (2018) can be satisfied where the local government appropriates unto itself a substantial part of the annual income derived from commercial use of the land by commercial activity that is neither “highly regulated” nor “statutorily regulated”? iii 4. Whether the Equal Protection claim should have survived the Rule 12 motion (although not meeting the District Court’s expectation of exactitude) because the legal viability of any alleged comparator is a close jury question, and a high degree of similarly required under Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) isn’t constitutionally compelled for a traditional Equal Protection claim which can be based on any “bad faith” reason, particularly in sui generis real property matters where there are some distinctions in the land itself and accordingly some variances in the governmental processes related to the land use issues? 5. Whether Petitioner’s request for a preliminary injunction should have been granted pendente lite to prevent further criminal local misdemeanor prosecutions by the Town of East Hampton’s own Town Attorney because all the criteria described in Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 594 U.S.__, 141 S. Ct. 2494 (2021) are satisfied, and the Town’s continuing criminal prosecutions to enforce its zoning code without a neutral unbiased prosecutor concretely demonstra

Docket Entries

2022-03-21
Petition DENIED.
2022-03-02
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 3/18/2022.
2022-02-28
Reply of petitioner Donald A. Vanderveer filed. (Distributed)
2022-02-25
Motion under Rule 35.1 filed to substitute Karin Vanderveer, as authorized representative, as petitioner in place of Donald A. Vanderveer, deceased.
2022-02-14
Brief of respondents Zoning Board of Appeals Town of East Hampton, et al. in opposition filed.
2022-02-09
Letter from counsel for petitioner dated February 1, 2022 received.
2022-01-10
Petition for a writ of certiorari filed. (Response due February 14, 2022)

Attorneys

Donald A. Vanderveer
Patricia Ann Pollak WeissAttorney at Law, Petitioner
Patricia Ann Pollak WeissAttorney at Law, Petitioner
Zoning Board of Appeals Town of East Hampton, et al.
Patrick J. MorganelliDevitt Spellman Barrett, LLP, Respondent
Patrick J. MorganelliDevitt Spellman Barrett, LLP, Respondent