City of Arlington, Texas v. De'On Crane, et al.
SocialSecurity FourthAmendment CriminalProcedure JusticiabilityDoctri
Where a suspect with an outstanding felony arrest warrant refuses repeated commands to turn off his car and exit the vehicle, would a reasonable officer conclude that the suspect poses a risk of serious harm?
QUESTIONS PRESENTED Rather than submit to arrest pursuant to multiple lawfully issued arrest warrants, a suspect who was pulled over for a traffic violation refused to exit his vehicle or even turn off his car’s engine. Ultimately, three police officers arrived on the scene. After repeated commands to turn off the engine and exit the vehicle were ignored, the defendant officer entered the rear of the vehicle, at which point: the suspect struggled with the defendant officer; the engine revved causing the tires to spin, and the vehicle to smoke and sway from side to side; the vehicle went into reverse, running over another officer; the vehicle then went into drive running over that officer a second time; and the suspect fled the scene with the defendant officer still struggling with the suspect, partly in and partly out of the car. The defendant officer fired his service pistol during the melee, resulting in the suspect’s death. The questions presented are: (1) Where a suspect with an outstanding felony arrest warrant refuses repeated commands to turn off his car and exit the vehicle, clearly states he will not surrender, struggles with an officer in the vehicle while revving the car’s engine, making the tires spin, and causing the car to smoke and sway from side to side, would a reasonable officer, who is half in and half out of the vehicle, conclude that the suspect poses a risk of serious harm to the officer or others? (2) Does a police officer attempting to execute a lawful arrest warrant against a suspect in a car who is struggling with the officer and revving his vehicle, making the tires spin and causing it to smoke and sway side to u side, “obviously” violate the suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights by deploying deadly force just before the car reverses running over his fellow officer? (3) Can the mere existence of a municipal policy of allowing traffic stops, lawful under Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), without more, constitute the moving force behind a subsequent unlawful use of force sufficient to impose municipal liability for such use of force?