Does the criminalization of expressive electronic communications in Texas Penal Code § 42.07(a)(7) implicate the First Amendment?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED In Snyder v. Phelps, this Court held that speech on matters of public concern cannot be punished “simply because it is upsetting or arouses contempt,” even when the speaker intends to annoy, harass or alarm. 562 U.S. 448, 458 (2011). Many other decisions of this Court hold the same. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals nonetheless held that a criminal prohibition in Texas Penal Code § 42.07(a)(7) against “electronic communications” repeatedly sent with the intent and likely result to “harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, embarrass, or offend” the recipient punishes “conduct,” does not implicate the First Amendment, and is not subject to any overbreadth analysis, even though the court construed the law as applying to “expressive speech” sent with an “intent to engage in the legitimate communication of ideas.” The questions presented are: 1. Does the criminalization of expressive electronic communications in Texas Penal Code § 42.07(a)(7) implicate the First Amendment? 2. Is Texas Penal Code § 42.07(a)(7) unconstitutionally overbroad?