Is 18 U.S.C. 2422(b) unconstitutionally vague-and-overbroad

QUESTIONS PRESENTED . 1). Is 18 U.S.C. 2422(b) unconstitutionally vague and/or overbroad due to the statute's use of the phrase "any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense"? 2). Does the Sixth Circuit's "adult intermediary" interpretation of §2422(b) and "substantial step" analysis impermissibly reduce 2422(b)'s burden of proof and render the statute overbroad as applied to Petitioner's case? 3). Is "other acts" evidence properly admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)'s "intent" exception when the expressed theory of admissibility as to how the evidence shows that intent is itself an improper propensity / character argument barred by that rule and this Court's decision in Old Chief v. U.S., 519 U.S. 172 (1997)? 4). Does the use of lawful text messages of a sexual nature between consenting adults exceed the "res gestae'’ exception and violate Supreme Court precedent when courts use those messages to infer criminal intent? 5). Is the efficacy of the Fourth Amendment and cases such as Franks v. Delaware and Riley v. California, diminished by the Sixth Circuit's affirmation of the challenged search warrants due to false/misleading statements, prewarrant access, and lack of specificity? , i 3 ’ .