Did the Sixth Circuit misapprehend § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii)'s standard by granting habeas relief to Jimmy Baugh when the newly discovered evidence at issue provided a strong alternative theory of guilt and further inculpated Baugh as an active participant in the murder?

QUESTION PRESENTED There are “two narrow exceptions” to the statutory rule that a claim contained in a second habeas petition must be dismissed. Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 661-62 (2001). One of those exceptions is premised on the discovery of new evidence. But relief is still precluded unless “the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii). This standard addresses Congress’s “central concern that the merits of concluded criminal proceedings not be revisited in the absence of a strong showing of actual innocence.” Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 558 (1998). The question presented is: Did the Sixth Circuit misapprehend § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii)’s standard by granting habeas relief to Jimmy Baugh when the newly discovered evidence at issue provided a strong alternative theory of guilt and further inculpated Baugh as an active participant in the murder?