Where 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) requires proof of active participation and prior knowledge for aiding and abetting, does Pinkerton liability have a role in securing heightened penalties under § 924(c)(3)(A)

QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Where 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) is a double-barreled crime that, at least in the context of aiding and abetting, requires proof both of a defendant’s active participation and his prior knowledge that someone would use a firearm during the commission of the predicate offense, does Pinkerton liability, which requires neither active participation nor prior knowledge, have any role to play in securing the heightened penalties under § 924(c)(3)(A), which looks at whether the defendant elected to use force knowing the harm his conduct would cause another? 2. Where in Taylor and Borden this Court looked to a defendant’s election to use force against another, as opposed to simply engaging in conduct that creates a risk that force would be deployed against another, when the government elects to secure a conviction on the basis of aiding and abetting liability for what would otherwise be a predicate offense, can the government use the defendant’s conviction as the basis for securing the enhanced penalties under § 924(c)(3)(A)? 3. Where a conviction for Hobbs Act robbery can be secured on the basis of placing someone in fear of injury to property, has an individual convicted of Hobbs Act robbery necessarily used, attempted to use or threatened to use violent physical force as required to qualify as a predicate under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A)? i