Gakuba's criminal indictment was void due to violation of the Video Privacy Protection Act

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW I. GAKUBA’S CRIMINAL INDICTMENT FOR ‘STATUTORY RAPE’ WAS VOID; NOT VOIDABLE—ALL CouRTsS HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER GAKUBA: THE WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS ARE VOID AB INITIO Gakuba was maliciously prosecuted and wrongly convicted of ‘statutory rape.’ Gakuba’s name and birthdate—essential elements to the crime—were illegally obtained in violation of the Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988 (“VPPA”) when I!linois police and prosecutors identified Gakuba via his Hollywood Video customer records without the required legal process. See 18 USC §2710(b)(2)(C); cf. Camfield v. City of Oklahoma City, 248 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2001) (near identical fact pattern); The VPPA has an exclusion mandate by statute. See accord USA v. Wilson, 633 Fed. Appx. 750, 753 (11" Cir. 2015) Id. at 753: “The availability of the suppression remedy for ... statutory, as opposed to constitutional violations ... turns on the provisions of [the statute] rather than the judicially fashioned Exclusionary Rule aimed at deterring violations of the 4" Amendment rights.” USA v. Donovan, 429 US 413, 432 n.22 (1977) (Stored Communications Act)). See 18 USC §2710(d); Amazon.com LLC v. Lay, 758 F. Supp. 2d 1154 (W.D. Wash. 2010) controls and is authoritative on Gakuba’s statutory right: VPPA, 18 USC §2710(d). Jane Does 16 intervened and obtained injunctive relief. Amazon, at 1160-61, 1170-71. Contemplated or actual violations of 18 USC §2710 et seq. constitute 1‘' Amendment violations. Jd at 1167-71. And because 18 USC §2710(d) explicitly bars biographical evidence before any “grand jury” (with language nearly identical to the FISA), with Ilinois police Charles O’Brien being the | i/x | culprit who flagrantly and egregiously violated 18 USC §2710(b)(2)(C) proceeded by 18 USC §2710(d), and, was the sole grand jury witness testifying to Gakuba’s birthdate, the grand jury indictment was VOID—not voidable. Every state and federal court that tried or reviewed this case was without COMPLETE jurisdiction. See Hoffler v. Bezio, 726 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2013). Id. at 157: An acquittal before a court having no jurisdiction is, of course, like all the proceedings in the case, absolutely void, and therefore no bar to subsequent } indictment and trial in a court which has jurisdiction of the offense. But, although the indictment was fatally defective, yet, if the court had jurisdiction of the cause and of the party, its judgment is not void, but only voidable by writ of error. Id. at 669-70, 16 S.Ct. 1192 (emphasis added; citations omitted); see 6 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 25.1(d) (3d ed.2012) (noting that Ball rejected broad view of jurisdictional error, instead holding that court needs only “authority ... to render judgment” for jeopardy to attach). Having concluded that the defective indictment rendered the judgment voidable, but not void, the Court held that jeopardy attached at trial and that the government could not retry the defendant for murder. See Ball v. United States, 163 U.S. at 670, 16 S.Ct. 1192; accord Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 130, 24 S.Ct. 797, 49 L.Ed. 114 (1904) (“It is, then, the settled law of this court that former jeopardy includes one who has been acquitted by a verdict duly rendered, although no judgment be entered on the verdict, and it was found upon a defective indictment.”); L/linois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 467-69, 93 S.Ct. 1066, 35 L.Ed.2d 425 (1973) (concluding jeopardy attached in state trial on defective indictment). Id. at n. 11: The distinction between void and voidable judgments is of less significance to a defendant initially found guilty because a reversal on either ground will generally result in his retrial, either because jeopardy never attached, in the rare case of a void judgment, or because it never terminated, in the more common case of a voidable judgment. See infra at [159-60]. Thus, the question of whether Hoffler's reversed judgment of conviction was void or voidable is pertinent o