Whether the presence of a visible alteration in a seized firearm is sufficient to satisfy the government's burden to prove that the defendant knew of the features of the firearm that bring it within the purview of the statutory definition of a machine gun?

QUESTION PRESENTED In Staples v. United States, 511 US 600 (1994), this Court held that in order for the government to prove that a defendant violated Title 26 U.S.C. §5861(d), the government must show that the defendant knew of the features of the firearm that bring it within the purview of the statutory definition of a machine gun. The same requirement applies to the crime of possessing a machinegun, Title 18 U.S.C. 922(0). Rogers v. United States, 522 U.S. 252, note 1 (1998). In Staples at 615, note 11, the Court explained that “knowledge can be inferred from circumstantial evidence, including any external indications signaling the nature of the weapon”. But the Court has provided no further guidance on what circumstantial evidence is sufficient to convict a defendant and/or, like in this case, to find by a preponderance of the evidence that a supervised release condition was violated. Lower courts have applied the opinion in Staples in different ways. Some circuit courts consider that admissions by a defendant, evidence of use of the automatic firearm, and evidence of possession are enough to prove knowledge. The First Circuit, however, has also ruled that the evidence of a visible “chip” that converts a semi-automatic firearm to a machinegun is generally sufficient to establish knowledge under Staples. The question is presented as follows: Whether the presence of a visible alteration in a seized firearm is sufficient to satisfy the government’s burden to prove that the defendant knew of the features of the firearm that bring it within the purview of the statutory definition of a machine gun? STATEMENT OF