Could reasonable jurists debate whether a state court's dispositive credibility determination regarding federal constitutional rights, based on a written statement being credited over the petitioner's live testimony regarding controverted facts, with no good cause for relying on an out-of-court writing, constituted an unreasonable application of this Court's authority under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and an unreasonable determination of the facts under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)

QUESTION PRESENTED Shortly before trial, Daniel Nepomucino entered guilty pleas with an agreed disposition characterized on the record as life with a 300-month minimum and lifetime post-prison supervision. In state post-conviction proceedings, Mr. Nepomucino asserted that his plea was not voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, testifying at a hearing that his attorney did not explain that he would remain in custody after 25 years if the parole board chose not to release him. He stated that, if he had understood the meaning of his agreed sentence correctly, he would not have pleaded guilty. Based on a written declaration of defense counsel, without the opportunity for the judge to observe the witness and for the petitioner to cross-examine him, the state court found that the petitioner was not credible and that the prior attorney was credible. The question presented is: Could reasonable jurists debate whether a state court’s dispositive credibility determination regarding federal constitutional rights, based on a written statement being credited over the petitioner’s live testimony regarding controverted facts, with no good cause for relying on an out-of-court writing, constituted an unreasonable application of this Court’s authority under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and an unreasonable determination of the facts under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).