Whether 'knowing' federal criminal liability based on 'willful blindness' requires a defendant to 'subjectively' believe there is a 'high probability' of a fact and take 'deliberate actions' to avoid learning that fact, or merely requires the defendant to 'fail[] to question' 'suspicious circumstances'

QUESTION PRESENTED The majority of federal statutes require a defendant to act “knowingly” to incur criminal liability, meaning that the defendant must have actual knowledge of some relevant fact. Courts have developed a common-law alternative to actual knowledge called “willful blindness.” As the Court explained in Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 769 (2011), a defendant may be deemed to have knowledge, even in the absence of actual knowledge, where “(1) [t]he defendant [] subjectively believe[s] that there is a high probability that a fact exists and (2) the defendant [] take[s] deliberate actions to avoid learning of that fact.” Willful blindness “surpasses recklessness and negligence,” encompassing only those “who can almost be said to have actually known the critical facts.” Id. Nonetheless, the circuits remain divided over when “willful blindness” can be used to establish knowledge. The question presented is whether “knowing” federal criminal liability based on “willful blindness” requires a defendant to “subjectively” believe there is a “high probability” of a fact and take “deliberate actions” to avoid learning that fact—as this Court opined in Global-Tech and as several circuits hold—or whether it merely requires the defendant to “fail[] to question” “suspicious circumstances,” as the Second Circuit holds. i