Did the Ninth Circuit's de novo disposition of Petitioner's Brady claim in the habeas corpus context, which focused exclusively on Bagley's earlier tule ('a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding might have been different,' 473 U.S. at 682), conflict with Kyles's and its progeny's expanded approach toward materiality?

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW In Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995), the Court held that to demonstrate a state’s suppressed impeachment evidence is material under the multi-prong inquiry set forth in cases such as Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Gilgio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), a defendant had to show that it “undermine[d] confidence in the outcome of the trial.” Although that formulation derived from language in United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985), Kyles’s focus on the trial’s fairness rather than the possibility of a different jury verdict marked a significant shift in how the Court approached materiality in the Brady/Giglio context. The question presented is as follows: Did the Ninth Circuit’s de novo disposition of Petitioner’s Brady claim in the habeas corpus context, which focused exclusively on Bagley’s earlier tule (“a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding might have been different,” 473 U.S. at 682), conflict with Kyles’s and its progeny’s expanded approach toward materiality? -prefix