Whether the Sixth Circuit defined the right at too high a level of generality

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Petitioners Wilkey and McRae are police deputies who allegedly violated Respondent Klaver’s Fourth Amendment rights by unnecessarily extending a traffic stop. The district court denied the Deputies’ motion for summary judgment on their qualified immunity defense. The following questions are presented: 1. This Court has repeatedly instructed the lower courts that in determining whether a right is clearly established for purposes of qualified immunity prior decisions must have defined the right with a high degree of specificity. Here, the Sixth Circuit identified the controlling rule to be that officers “may not detain a driver for longer than necessary to complete a traffic stop simply because they want to investigate other crimes.” Did the Sixth Circuit define the right at too high a level of generality? 2. As part of a lawful traffic stop, Deputies Wilkey and McRae observed that Klaver had unlawfully tinted windows, unlawfully placed a sticker on his license plate, was visibly shaking, refused to explain why he was shaking, and was generally uncooperative. In denying qualified immunity, the Sixth Circuit did not cite a case with comparable facts. Did the Sixth Circuit err in holding that ii Deputies Wilkey and McRae are not entitled to qualified immunity? iii RULE 14(B) STATEMENT The parties in the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit were petitioners Deputy Daniel Wilkey and Deputy Tyler McRae and respondent William Eugene Klaver. Hamilton County is a party to the original case; however, it was not a party to the appeal. Deputies Wilkey and McRae were sued individually and in their official capacities as deputy sheriffs. The following is a list of all directly