Whether a juror's communication to the jury during deliberations of highly prejudicial specialized factual information that was based on his professional knowledge and experience, but which was not part of the evidence introduced at trial, violated petitioner's rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments

QUESTION PRESENTED A person accused of a crime is entitled to have his guilt or innocence determined solely on the basis of evidence introduced at trial. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485 (1978). “In the constitutional sense, trial by jury in a criminal case necessarily implies at the very least that the evidence against a defendant shall come from the witness stand where there is full judicial protection of the defendant’s right of confrontation, of crossexamination, and of counsel.” Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472 (1965) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The lower court in this case offended these fundamental principles by ruling that a juror may properly inject into a jury’s deliberations prejudicial information based on that juror’s specialized training and experience that was not part of the evidence introduced at trial. The question presented is whether a juror’s communication to the jury during deliberations of highly prejudicial specialized factual information that was based on his professional knowledge and experience, but which was not part of the evidence introduced at trial, violated petitioner’s rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. i RELATED CASES ¢ Commonwealth v. Morrison, 491 Mass. 1103 (Table) (Mass. Supreme Judicial Court 2023) ¢ Commonwealth v. Morrison, 195 N.E.3d 949 (Table) (Mass. App. Ct. 2022) ¢ Commonwealth v. Morrison, 150 N.E.3d 826 (Mass. App. Ct. 2020) ii