No. 22-7807

Chayna Holguin v. United States

Lower Court: Fifth Circuit
Docketed: 2023-06-16
Status: Denied
Type: IFP
Relisted (2)IFP Experienced Counsel
Tags: criminal-history federal-sentencing first-step-act rule-of-lenity safety-valve sentencing-guidelines statutory-interpretation
Key Terms:
SocialSecurity Securities Immigration
Latest Conference: 2024-03-22 (distributed 2 times)
Question Presented (AI Summary)

Whether the 'and' in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) means 'and' or 'or' for determining eligibility for the 'safety valve' provision

Question Presented (OCR Extract)

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW The “safety valve” provision of the federal sentencing statute requires a district court to ignore any mandatory minimum and instead impose a sentence pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines if a defendant is convicted of certain nonviolent drug offenses and can meet five sets of criteria. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). Congress amended the first set of criteria—§ 3553(f)(1)—in the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 402, 132 Stat. 5194, 5221, broad criminal justice and sentencing reform legislation designed to provide a second chance for nonviolent offenders. A defendant satisfies § 3553(f)(1) if she “does not have—(A) more than 4 criminal history points, excluding any criminal history points resulting from a 1point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; (B) a prior 3-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; and (C) a prior 2-point violent offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) (emphasis added). The question presented is whether the “and” in § 3553(f)(1) means “and,” so that a defendant satisfies the provision so long as she does not have (A) more than 4 criminal history points, excluding any points resulting from a 1-point offense, (B) a 3-point offense, and (C) a 2-point violent offense, or whether the “and” means il “or,” so that a defendant satisfies the provision only if she does not have (A) more than 4 criminal history points, excluding any points resulting from a 1-point offense, (B) a 3-point offense, or (C) a 2point violent offense. ! 1 This same question is before the Court in Pulsifer v. United States, No. 22-340. The Court’s decision in Pulsifer likely will be dispositive of Holguin’s petition for writ of certiorari. Accordingly, Holguin’s petition should be held pending the Court’s resolution of Pulsifer, and then disposed of as appropriate in light of the decision in that case. ili No. In the Supreme Court of the United States CHAYNA HOLGUIN, PETITIONER, V. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RESPONDENT PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Petitioner Chayna Holguin asks that a writ of certiorari issue to review the opinion and judgment entered by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on March 16, 2023.

Docket Entries

2024-03-25
Petition DENIED.
2024-03-18
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 3/22/2024.
2023-08-31
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 9/26/2023.
2023-08-16
Memorandum of respondent United States filed.
2023-07-12
Motion to extend the time to file a response is granted and the time is extended to and including August 16, 2023.
2023-07-11
Motion to extend the time to file a response from July 17, 2023 to August 16, 2023, submitted to The Clerk.
2023-06-14
Petition for a writ of certiorari and motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis filed. (Response due July 17, 2023)

Attorneys

Chayna Holguin
Bradford Wayne BoganFederal Public Defender, Western District of Texas, Petitioner
Bradford Wayne BoganFederal Public Defender, Western District of Texas, Petitioner
United States of America
Elizabeth B. Prelogar — Respondent
Elizabeth B. PrelogarSolicitor General, Respondent