Whether the indefinite postponement of prosecutions in North Carolina, for the purpose of coercing guilty pleas, violates the Speedy Trial Clause or the Due Process Clause

QUESTION PRESENTED In Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967), the Court held unconstitutional a practice unique to North Carolina, under which the state indefinitely postponed certain prosecutions over the objection of the accused. The Court determined that this practice violated the Speedy Trial Clause. Justice Harlan, concurring in the result, took the view that this practice violated the Due Process Clause. District attorneys in North Carolina have now revived this practice. In DWI cases, where the defendant fails to appear for a scheduled court date, the state indefinitely postpones the defendant’s prosecution. The charge remains pending, but the case is removed from the court’s docket. The district attorneys refuse to reinstate these prosecutions unless defendants agree to plead guilty and to waive their right to appeal. Defendants are left in perpetual limbo, with no way to contest the charges against them. Their only exit from this predicament is to relinquish their right to a trial. The question presented is whether this practice violates either the Speedy Trial Clause or the Due Process Clause.