Did the courts below properly apply the Anderson-Burdick standard?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED In 2020, New York passed massive, historic increases to its thresholds for independent minor political parties to gain and retain access to the ballot. The practical effect of these increases was the elimination of contemporary independent minor parties such as Petitioners and the predictable result that virtually no independent minor party will be able to attain or retain ballot access. In upholding the increases, the courts below purported to apply the standard first developed in Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983), and Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992): a court must “weigh the character and magnitude of the burden the State’s rule imposes on those rights against the interests the State contends justify that burden, and consider the extent to which the State’s concerns make the burden necessary. Regulations imposing severe burdens on plaintiffs’ rights must be narrowly tailored and advance a compelling state interest. Lesser burdens, however, trigger less exacting review, and a State’s important regulatory interests will usually be enough to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions.” Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997) (cleaned up). In the minor party context, the Court has stated that “the State may not act to maintain the ‘status quo’ by making it virtually impossible for any but the two major parties to achieve ballot positions for their candidates.” Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 965 (1982) (plurality op.). The courts below upheld the increased thresholds. The questions presented are: 1. Did the courts below properly apply the Ander ii son-Burdick standard as a “two-tracked approach” rather than as “a sliding-scale balancing analysis” when they found the increased thresholds do not impose a severe burden on Petitioners and then determined that the thresholds were “coherent,” “rational,” “reasonable,” and “justified” under a “quite deferential” review? Compare Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 205 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring), with id., at 210 (Souter, J., dissenting). 2. In assessing the burden to Petitioners in light of New York’s requirement to collect over 1,070 valid signatures-per-day to run a candidate and thereby earn ballot access, did the courts below err by merely analogizing to prior precedent from this Court discussing collecting a certain amount of also done by the First, Third, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits—or must a court apply a contextual analysis as it would for other ballot access restrictions, as performed by the Sixth and Eighth Circuits? 3. Did the courts below err in finding that the thresholds did not impose a severe burden (which would warrant strict scrutiny) because two “fusion” parties survived the new thresholds—i.e., parties whose existence depends on cross-nominating major party candidates for governor and now president— even though this Court has previously held that “fusion” is of little constitutional significance? See Timmons, 520 U.S. at 362-64.