Whether receipt of a phone call after opting in to receive marketing communications is a 'concrete injury in fact' sufficient to confer Article III standing for purposes of a TCPA action

QUESTION PRESENTED This case arises from the intersection of this Court’s opinion in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021), with a class action lawsuit under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227. TransUnion limited Article III standing by holding that all plaintiffs in a class action must have suffered a “concrete injury in fact”—not just a bare statutory violation—in order to bring suit in federal court. Petitioner ViSalus, Inc. (“ViSalus”) was sued in 2015 by named plaintiff Lori Wakefield, a former ViSalus promoter, on behalf of herself and a class of others who had provided their phone numbers to ViSalus and consented to receive marketing communications, but whose written consent did not meet the technical requirements of a newly adopted FCC regulation. Plaintiffs claimed only statutory damages. The harm from receiving a phone call after opting in to a marketing list is far from “concrete,” and the impact of TransUnion on class action lawsuits brought under the TCPA has been assessed unevenly by federal courts nationwide, creating a conflict between the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits. The question presented is: Whether, in light of TransUnion, receipt of a phone call after opting in to receive marketing communications is a “concrete injury in fact” sufficient to confer Article III standing for purposes of a TCPA action. li PARTIES The following individuals or entities are or were