Whether the application of the 'substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole' standard of review for Board determinations, 29 U.S.C. §160(e), (f), should be reinvigorated with the rigor that Congress intended in the Taft-Hartley Act when it instituted the more demanding standard of review, thereby resolving a significant split among the Circuits on the issue

QUESTIONS PRESENTED The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) established the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) and conferred power upon it to adjudicate unfair labor practice complaints, with judicial review conducted in the United States Courts of Appeals. In the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, better known as the Taft-Hartley Act, Congress amended the NLRA to provide greater scrutiny of Board determinations and to limit the Board’s remedial power to order reinstatement of employees who have been suspended or discharged for cause. This Court, in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951), confirmed that the Taft-Hartley amendment to the standard of review required more rigorous review than the original “substantial evidence” test and demanded that courts examine and consider the whole record for evidence supporting or detracting from the Board’s findings and determination when deciding whether to enforce or vacate Board orders. A circuit split has developed on application of this standard. Similarly, the “for cause” limitation that the TaftHartley Act imposed on reinstatement of employees discharged for cause has fallen essentially into disuse because the Board has interpreted the proviso to be inapplicable when it concludes an anti-union motive also is present in a case. A circuit split has developed regarding deference to this interpretation. This Petition presents two questions: 1. Whether the application of the “substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole” standard of review for Board determinations, 29 U.S.C. §160(e), (f), u should be reinvigorated with the rigor that Congress intended in the Taft-Hartley Act when it instituted the more demanding standard of review, thereby resolving a significant split among the Circuits on the issue. 2. Whether the Court should restore the meaning of the proviso inserted in Section 10(¢) of the NLRA by the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. §160(), that “[nJo order of the Board shall require the reinstatement of any individual as an employee who has been suspended or discharged, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was suspended or discharged for cause,” and give the proviso its plain meaning rather than deferring to a construction of the statute adopted by the Board, and thereby resolve a split among the Circuits on the issue.