Does an interlocutory ruling that dismisses some (but not all) of a plaintiff's claims with prejudice become an appealable 'final decision' if the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses her action under Rule 41(a)?

QUESTION PRESENTED Petitioner Marilyn Williams is the latest victim ensnared by the “finality trap,” which has confounded the lower courts for decades. The typical fact pattern is on display here. Ms. Williams brought five claims against the respondents. The district court dismissed all claims, four without prejudice, and one with prejudice and without leave to re-plead after finding it preempted by federal law. But to Ms. Williams, the game of litigation was not worth the candle without that claim restored. So she responded by filing an amended pleading that dropped all of her other claims, asserting only the claim that the district court found preempted. Then Ms. Williams dismissed her action under Rule 41(a) and appealed the district court’s preemption ruling. The Eleventh Circuit dismissed for want of jurisdiction, holding that Ms. Williams had not appealed a “final decision” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The ruling deepens a longstanding circuit split over the construction of those statutory words. And the sharp disagreement among the lower courts is not academic. There is no doubt that, had Ms. Williams been before different courts of appeals, they would have wielded judicial power. The question presented is: Does an interlocutory ruling that dismisses some (but not all) of a plaintiff’s claims with prejudice become an appealable “final decision” if the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses her action under Rule 41(a)? (i)