How far afield from prior criminal sentencing cases does a doctrinal opinion from a regional circuit court of appeals have to go before it qualifies as a 'new rule of law' excusing deficient performance by sentencing counsel?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1) How far afield from prior criminal sentencing cases does a doctrinal opinion from a regional circuit court of appeals have to go before it qualifies as a “new rule of law” excusing deficient performance by sentencing counsel? See 7 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 28.6(d) (4th ed.) (“The ‘new rule’ concept”). The case at issue is United States v. Mulkern, 854 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2017) (holding that a conviction for “trafficking heroin under section 1103 of the Maine narcotics statute did not qualify as a “serious drug offense”). The comparator ‘old’ cases [against which it was decided that Mulken qualified as being sufficiently ‘new’ from] were Supreme Court precedents cited in Mulkern [Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) and Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005)] that were obviously handed down many years earlier. 2) Should this Court grant review under Supreme Cr. R. 10(a) (Noting circuit splits as indicative of “the reasons the Court considers” to grant certiorari) when the First Circuit concluded in Thompson’s case that doctrine is inconsistent across the various regional courts of appeals? “Case law from other circuits involving arguably similar state statutes was mixed.” Panel Opinion, at 21 (citing cases from the 1*t, 4th, 5th, 11th Circuits). i