Whether the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that extraordinary circumstances for equitable tolling must make earlier filing 'impossible'

Questions Presented California convicted James McClain of first-degree murder for a shooting. McClain claimed that, before he shot the decedent, the decedent struck him unprovoked. This should have resulted in a selfdefense acquittal or a lesser homicide (e.g. voluntary manslaughter or second-degree murder). But the State suppressed McClain’s best corroborating evidence—a witness’ statement that she saw the decedent first strike McClain. McClain spent years looking for this witness. Once he found her, he spent years attempting to get her affidavit to prove a Brady violation. But the time it took McClain to locate and gather this evidence rendered the Brady claim untimely. That was so, the Ninth Circuit held, because McClain was not entitled to equitable tolling as the State’s Brady suppression did not make an earlier filing impossible. The Ninth Circuit also held that McClain failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability of an acquittal on a self-defense theory or a lesser conviction of voluntary the reasonable probability of a lesser second-degree murder conviction only. Therefore, the questions presented are: 1. In assessing whether extraordinary circumstances stood ina petitioner’s path for equitable-tolling purposes, do those circumstances need to make earlier filing “impossible”? 2. Did the Ninth Circuit reversibly err by ignoring McClain’s clearest argument for prejudice?